(SR) Necessarily, for any mental state M, M is phenomenally conscious iff M represents itself in the right way.
Different versions of SR can be obtained by unpacking "in the right way" in different ways. My own version construes "the right way" as "non-derivatively, specifically, and essentially." 1 What motivates SR, at least to me, is a certain conception of the structure of phenomenal character. As I look at the blue sky, I undergo a conscious experience, and there is a bluish way it is like for me to undergo that experience. This "bluish way it is like for me" is the experience's phenomenal character. As Levine (2001) notes, there is a conceptual distinction to be drawn between two components of this "bluish way it is like for me": (i) the bluish component, and (ii) the for-me component. I call the former qualitative character and the latter subjective character (Kriegel 2005 (Kriegel , 2009 . To a first approximation, the experience's bluish qualitative character is what makes it the experience it is, but its for-me-ness is what makes it an experience at all. A better, if initially less clear, approximation is this: my experience is the experience it is because it is bluish-for-me, and is an experience at all because it is somehow-for-me (or qualitatively-for-me).
2 Thus qualitative character is what varies among conscious experiences, while subjective character is what is common to them.
Many philosophers have assumed that the core of the problem of consciousness is qualitative character, but an interesting result of the above conception of the structure of phenomenal character is that it is actually subjective character that is more central (Levine 2001; Kriegel 2009 ). Although it is important to understand what accounts for the differences among conscious experiences, it is more central to the problem of consciousness to understand what distinguishes conscious experiences from nonconscious mental states. According to Levine and me, the deeply mystifying feature of phenomenal consciousness is that when I have a conscious experience, the experience does not occur only in me, but also for me. There is some sort of direct presence, a subjective significance, of the experience to the subject. This is of course not uncontroversial, but I will not argue for it here. What I want to focus on is the inference from this conception of the structure of phenomenal character to self-representationalism.
Self-representationalism is essentially an account of subjective character: it claims that a mental state has subjective character just in case, and because, it represents itself in the right way. 3 The argument for this can be thought of as proceeding in three stages.
Here I will only sketch the argument; for details, see Ch.4 of SC.
First, for a conscious experience to be not only in me, but also for me, I would have to be aware of it. The awareness in question need not be particularly focused or attentive. But there must be some minimal awareness of a mental state if the state is to be described as exhibiting "for-me-ness." So we can reason as follows:
1) Necessarily, for any mental state M and subject S, such that S is in M, M is phenomenally conscious iff M has subjective character (is for S).
2) Necessarily, for any mental state M and subject S, such that S is in M, M has subjective character (is for S) iff S is aware of M in the right way. Therefore, 3) Necessarily, for any mental state M and subject S, such that S is in M, M is phenomenally conscious iff S is aware of M in the right way. (1, 2) This is the first stage of the argument. It takes us from phenomenal character to awareness.
The second stage employs crucially a pair of relatively uncontroversial lemmas, to the effects that (a) being aware of something is a matter of representing it and (b)
representing something is a matter of being in mental state that represents it: 4) Necessarily, for any entity X and subject S, S is aware of X in the right way iff S has a representation of X of the right kind. (Lemma) 5) Necessarily, for any entity X and subject S, S has a representation of X of the right kind iff there is a mental state M*, such that (i) S is in M* and (ii) M* represents X in the right way. (Lemma) Therefore, 6) Necessarily, for any mental state M and subject S, such that S is in M, M is phenomenally conscious iff there is a mental state M*, such that (i) S is in M* and
(ii) M* represents M in the right way. (3, 4, 5) The conclusion, Proposition 9, is equivalent to SR. The negation of Premise 8, while not equivalent to the so-called higher-order theory of consciousness, is a commitment of that theory. 4 What is needed to complete the argument are considerations that support Premise 8.
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In Ch.4 of SC I offer a battery of considerations against higher-order theory, hence in favor of Premise 8. I cannot go through all of them, and anyway many are familiar from the literature. But the consideration which is least familiar, yet which personally has been most persuasive to me, can be put thus: for-me-ness is internal to the phenomenology of conscious experience -it is a component of phenomenal character, after all -and this cannot be accommodated by higher-order theory, only by selfrepresentationalism. There are two parts to this.
The first part is the claim that for-me-ness is internal to the phenomenology -that it is itself a conscious phenomenon. This seems to me self-evident. The very reason to believe in the for-me-ness of experience is fundamentally phenomenological: it is derived not from experimental research, nor from conceptual analysis, nor from any other sources, but rather from a certain first-person impression. This suggests that for-me-ness is phenomenologically manifest. Together, 8a and 8b entail 8. With 8 in place, and given our starting point in 1 and 2 and the relatively uncontroversial lemmas in 4 and 5, we obtain 9. Call this the master argument for self-representationalism.
Self-Consciousness and the Explanatory Gap
I mentioned that, according to the conception of phenomenal character that motivates self-representationalism, the core of the problem of consciousness pertains to subjective character. This can be put in terms of the so-called explanatory gap (Levine 1983) : while there may be some perplexity as to how we might reductively explain differences in phenomenal character in terms of neural activity, surely the heart of the philosophical 7-6 6 anxiety surrounding consciousness concerns how we might reductively explain the very existence of phenomenal character. It is the existence conditions of phenomenality, not its identity conditions, that present the deep mystery.
If this is right, then the core of the philosophical problem of consciousness is the explanatory gap between subjective character -the for-me-ness of conscious states -and physical properties. This is a surprising result, insofar as there is clearly a close connection between subjective character and self-consciousness, and yet it is a staple of recent discussions of consciousness that the explanatory gap is properly applied to phenomenal consciousness but not self-consciousness. In this section, I want to explore the connection between subjective character and self-consciousness, and its implications for the explanatory gap. More specifically, I want to argue that there are two different phenomena of self-consciousness, and while one of them is at most contingently connected to subjective character, the other is essentially connected.
The distinction between two phenomena of self-consciousness that I have in mind can be brought out by contrasting two types of report of self-consciousness: It is interesting to note a certain parallelism between the kind of phenomenon intransitive self-consciousness is and the nature of subjective character according to selfrepresentationalism. In the former, there turns out to be numerical identity between the conscious state and the state of self-consciousness; in the latter, between the conscious state and the subject's awareness of it. This may suggest that there is an intimate connection between intransitive self-consciousness and subjective character. The simplest account of this connection would be a certain identity thesis: subjective character just is intransitive self-consciousness. On this view, the fact that a conscious experience is for the subject and the fact that the subject self-consciously undergoes the experience is one and the same fact: to say that there is a way it is like for me to perceive the sky is to say that I self-consciously perceive the sky.
7-8 8
The reasoning we have pursued leads to an interesting conclusion: the core of the problem of consciousness is the explanatory gap between a certain kind of selfconsciousness -namely, intransitive self-consciousness -and physical properties. It is the fact that we cannot reductively explain in terms of neural activity what makes it the case that a subject not only perceives x, but does so self-consciously, without quite being self-conscious of doing so, that is at the source of the philosophical anxiety surrounding consciousness.
In SC Chs.6-8, I suggest a potential neural reducer of subjective character. My strategy is to first specify the abstract structure involved in a mental state selfrepresenting, then identify a neural structure that realizes this abstract specification. This Call the kind of self-representation this would be crude self-representation. The problem with crude self-representation is that when we actually consult such theories as Dretske's (1981 , 1988 ), Millikan's (1984 , and Fodor's (1990), we find that they identify natural relations that are anti-reflexive: nothing can bear them to itself. At its heart, the problem is that these relations typically involve causal relations, and those are often antireflexive. we may call the relation R that x bears to y just when this is so the representationtransmission relation. 9 For example, a picture might represent a façade in virtue of bearing the right teleo-informational relation to it, and represent the house of which it is a façade in virtue of (i) bearing that relation to the façade and (ii) the façade bearing the representation-transmission relation to the house. When we put together all three elements into an overall account of self-representation, we obtain the following: a selfrepresenting mental state is a mental state with two parts, such that one part bears the right natural (e.g., teleo-informational) relation to the other part and this second part bears the representation-transmission relation to the whole of which they are both parts. More 
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Once this relatively specific structure has been identified, we can seek brain structures and processes that implement it: neural structures we have good reasons to describe as involving two parts one of which bears the right natural relation to the other while the other bears the right representation-transmission relation to the whole of which they are both parts. Although an endeavor of this sort is extremely speculative at present, I indulge in it in Ch.7 of SC. With the aid of several empirical claims, the speculative hypothesis I arrive at is this: a conscious experience of blue, say, is realized by neural synchronization of activation in the right part of visual cortex -V4, as it happens -and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). The V4 activation realizes M2, the dlPFC activation realizes M1, and the neural synchronization between them realizes the cognitive-unity relation between M1 and M2 in virtue of which they are parts of a single state rather than two separate states. Thus a brain state such as this realizes the perceptual experience's qualitative character through the specific activation in sensory cortex (in this case, the right subpopulation of neurons in V4) and its subjective character, or intransitive self-consciousness, through the neural synchronization with dlPFC activation.
Observe that this account of the neural implementation of self-representation, founded as it is on a distinction between crude and subtle self-representation, casts selfrepresentation as neurobiologically perfectly plausible. Prinz (this volume) complains of neurobiological implausibility in self-representationalism, on the grounds that neurons do not appear to represent themselves. This objection misfires, however, as subtle selfrepresentation does not require, and in fact shuns, the notion that some neurons represent themselves. What self-represents is not this or that neuron, but a structured neural state, which moreover self-represents only insofar as some part of it represents the whole of it.
In any case, given the argument of this section, the above account of neural implementation suggests that the alleged explanatory gap between consciousness and matter comes down to a much more specific explanatory gap between intransitive selfconsciousness and synchronization with dlPFC activation. The problem of consciousness can thus be distilled into the problem of bridging the explanatory gap between intransitive self-consciousness and synchronization with dlPFC activation.
Explanatory Gaps and Explanatory Sequences
How could those brute and blind processes unfolding in the dark corners of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex constitute a subject's not only perceiving something, but perceiving it self-consciously, in a way the blindsight patient who perceives the same thing does not?
Consider a sorites series that takes you from a yellow circle to a red circle. As you are force-marched through the series, any pair of adjacent circles are visually indistinguishable to you, yet the first and last circles are very much distinguishable. In other words, when the steps in a sequence of this sort are small enough, the relation of visual indiscriminability will hold between the two sides of each step but not between the start and end points of the sequence. The relation of explainability -or perhaps just reductive explainability (as distinguished, say, from causal explainability) -might exhibit similar behavior, though perhaps for different reasons (not because it is vague). A series of claims can be envisaged, such that every claim n+1 is a reductive explanation of claim n, but there is no reductive-explanatory relation between the first and last claims.
In light of the previous sections, we might wish to consider the following sequence of proposed explanatory steps:
Step 1: explain subjective character/intransitive self-consciousness in terms of a certain type of awareness
Step 2: explain this type of awareness in terms of representation
Step 3: explain the relevant kind of representation in terms of self-representation
Step 4: explain the naturalistic possibility of self-representation in terms of subtle self-representation
Step 5: explain subtle self-representation in terms of synchronization with dlPFC activation Each step seems to involve an explanatory move that does not strike us immediately as outlandish: the gap between explanandum and explanans does not seem obviously unbridgeable. So the relevant explanation relation does hold within each step. 11 Yet the explanatory gap looms ominously when we consider, in one intellectual act as it were, intransitive self-consciousness and synchronization with dlPFC activity. The same sense of mystery obtains if we add:
Step 0: explain phenomenal consciousness in terms of subjective character/intransitive self-consciousness This is the more familiar explanatory gap, between phenomenal consciousness to neural activation, which I claim is due to the more specific gap concerning subjective character or intransitive self-consciousness.
In any case, on this line of thought the explanatory gap arises because of an unwarranted expectation that a complex sequence of explanations could be appreciated in one intellectual act. When we look at water and H 2 O, a single intellectual act would leave us equally puzzled about how it is that the right interlocking of an oxygen atom and two hydrogen atoms could make something wet. It is a general feature of the relationship between the manifest image and the scientific image that structures and processes from the latter do not illuminate ones from the former in such a direct way. The illumination is not provided in a single encompassing act of apprehension. Rather, it is appreciated indirectly through patient consideration of a sequence of local explanations too long or complex to grasp at once (see Pollock and Cruz 1999).
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Note as well that we are familiar, in everyday life, with two kinds of understanding. Sometimes we understand something in a purely intellectual, somewhat cold-blooded manner. On other, relatively rarer occasions, we understand something in a more visceral way, where we feel like we can see the truth (or plausibility) of some notion. Indeed, it sometimes happens that we understand something first in the coldblooded manner and suddenly in the more visceral way. The latter experience of understanding is much more phenomenologically impressive, and is also more satisfying and more confidence-imbuing. But it is also rarer, and there is no reason to suppose that it is always available: there may be areas where the human cognitive system does not have the resources that would allow us to undergo the experience of this more visceral variety of understanding. We must there rest content with the phenomenologically lamer variety of understanding -and remember that it is still a variety of understanding.
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Taking these considerations into account, one may suggest that the explanatory gap is an illusion grounded in the attempt to take in a complex sequence of explanations in a single intellectual act. 14 The sequence may simply be too complex for us to do so successfully, in a way that summons the visceral phenomenology of understanding. But the other variety of understanding, the more "cold-blooded" variety, can still be enjoyed when we consider patiently the sequence of explanatory steps presented above, perhaps precisely because we do experience the visceral variety whenever we consider any single step in the sequence.
On this interpretation of the line of thought under consideration, there is no genuine explanatory gap between intransitive self-consciousness and synchronization with dlPFC activity. There is in fact a reductive explanation of the former in terms of the latter. It is just that this reductive explanation is not such as to elicit in us a visceral phenomenology of understanding. although their identity is a posteriori, it is nonetheless epistemically transparent, in that a subject who knew all the non-identity truths about water and all the non-identity truths about H 2 O would be in a position to establish the identity of water and H 2 O. However, Chalmers and Jackson argue, once the connection between reduced and reducer is epistemically transparent, the reduction is not only ontological but also epistemic: one is in a position to explain the facts about the reduced in terms of the facts about the reducer.
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Applying Chalmers and Jackson's reasoning to the above argument for dualism about intransitive self-consciousness, we obtain the following defense of Premise 2 in the argument: 2.1) We are justified in holding that one property ontologically reduces to another only if the connection between them is epistemically transparent; but 2.2) When the connection between two properties is epistemically transparent, we are also justified in holding that one epistemically reduces to the other; therefore, 2.3) We are justified in holding that one property ontologically reduces to another only if we are also justified in holding that one epistemically reduces to the other; so, 2) If intransitive selfconsciousness is epistemically irreducible to physical properties, then it is ontologically irreducible to them as well. What materialists typically reject in Chalmers and Jackson's reasoning is Premise 2.1: they insist that the paradigmatic ontological reductions (e.g., of
water to H 2 O) is epistemically opaque (see Block and Stalnaker 1999) . The debate then centers on the proper treatment of paradigmatic instances of ontological reduction.
The approach suggested above to the explanatory gap avoids such debates. For instead of denying Premise 2.1, it denies Premise 2.2, allowing that epistemic transparency can arise even in the absence of epistemic reduction. On the emerging view, a sequence of explanatory steps may be such that there is a genuine explanatory gap between the first and last items in the sequence, but the continuity that can be traced between them through consideration of the intermediary steps generates epistemic transparency in the entire sequence: the connection between the first and last items in the series is epistemically transparent to any subject who can follow each explanatory step in the series. Thus because every step in the series with which I opened this section is an instance of reductive explanation, and we can follow the sequence, the identification (or ontological reduction) of intransitive self-consciousness to synchronization with dlPFC activity is epistemically transparent; but because the relation of reductive explainability is not transitive -whether for reasons of vagueness or some other reasons -intransitive self-consciousness is not reductively explainable in terms of synchronization with dlPFC activity. This seems to be the correct analogy with the sorites series of circles.
On this interpretation, the explanatory gap between intransitive self-consciousness (or subjective character) and synchronization with dlPFC activity is real, in that we cannot explain why the "subjective facts" (the facts of intransitive self-consciousness) are what they are in terms of the neural facts being what they are. Intransitive selfconsciousness is genuinely epistemically irreducible to synchronization with dlPFC activity. Nonetheless, it does not follow that an ontological reduction of intransitive selfconsciousness to synchronization with dlPFC activity must be epistemically opaque, leaving us with no insight into why it should be that intransitive self-consciousness is nothing but synchronization with dlPFC activity. On the contrary, by tracing a sequence of reductive explanations step by step, we can come to appreciate why it should be that intransitive self-consciousness is nothing but synchronization with dlPFC activity, sayeven though contemplating the notion that it is in a single intellectual act produces in us only the phenomenology of incredulity.
18
To conclude. I started this section with an analogy between a sequence of (reductive) explanations leading from intransitive self-consciousness to the neural process of synchronization with dlPFC activity, on the one hand, and a sequence of visually indistinguishable pairs of circles leading from a yellow circle to a red one, on the other. I then offered two interpretations of the analogy. On the first interpretation, the explanatory gap between intransitive self-consciousness and synchronization with dlPFC activity is illusory: there is no explanatory gap between the two, but the appearance of such a gap arises from the unwarranted expectation that we undergo a visceral phenomenology of understanding upon contemplating the start and end points of the explanatory sequence. 19 A tighter analogy is offered by the second interpretation: the explanatory gap is genuine, in that we really do not understand how intransitive selfconsciousness could be nothing but synchronization with dlPFC activity, but nonetheless it is so reducible, and moreover in an epistemically transparent manner (thanks to the sequence of reductive explanations connecting the two). I am happy with either interpretation, but find the second vastly more satisfactory, insofar as it manages to respect rather than dismiss the force of the explanatory gap intuition.
Levine's "Just More Representation" Objection
This self-representational approach to the explanatory gap can be resisted in two main ways. One is to deny the general claim that a series of reductive explanations can underlie an epistemically transparent physicalistic reduction of intransitive self-consciousness even in the absence of reductive explanation of it in physical terms. The other is to claim that, however the general issue turns out, one of the five individual steps of reductive explanation I described in the previous section fails. The most acute criticism of selfrepresentationalism that takes this second form is developed by Levine (2006) , who argues that the for-me-ness of experience cannot be recovered by self-representation, because the kind of awareness involved in it cannot be accounted for in terms of the notion of representation at play in the relevant type of self-representation. This is to reject
Step 2 in the explanatory sequence (explaining awareness in terms of representation).
For Levine, self-representation cannot account for for-me-ness, because just as something needs to bestow for-me-ness -a "subjective significance" -on any old representation, so something needs to bestow that subjective significance on self- Subjectivity, as I described it earlier, is that feature of a mental state by virtue of which it is of significance for the subject; not merely something happening within her, but "for her." The selfrepresentation thesis aims to explicate that sense of significance for the subject through the fact that the state is being represented. But now, what makes that representation itself of significance for the subject, and thus conscious?
The answer to this question cannot be, of course, that a self-representing representation is of significance to the subject because it represents itself to be self-representing. That would quickly lead to an infinite regress. The suspicion Levine raises is that there may not be a way to answer his question without invoking phenomenality.
Certainly what makes a representation "for the subject" cannot be what it represents. It cannot be that when a representation represents x, it is not for the subject, so that the subject does not self-consciously represents x, but when it represents y, it is. And at a first pass, it might seem that this is precisely what self-representationalism claims. It claims that what makes some representations "for the subject" is that what they represent is themselves. Yet the fact that a state represents itself rather than something other than itself does not dissolve the mystery involved in it representing whatever it does to oneself, i.e., in a self-conscious sort of way. Much more plausible is that representations endowed with subjective character, in virtue of which the subject represents self- The heart of the objection is therefore not the what/how (object/manner) distinction. Rather, it must be the thought that there is no way to account for the right manner of representation in non-subjective terms, as would be required for any ontological reduction of subjective character. Even if a certain non-subjective, nonphenomenal specification of the right manner were extensionally adequate, such that no counter-example could be found to the thesis that necessarily, a mental state has subjective character/intransitive self-consciousness iff it self-represents in that manner, we would still have on our hands an explanatory gap between subjective character/intransitive self-consciousness and this non-phenomenal specification of the relevant manner. It would still be unclear how this specific kind of self-representation, understood in non-phenomenal terms, could give rise to the distinctive kind of awareness of one's conscious experiences that is imbued with subjective significance and constitutes intransitive self-consciousness. Thus as long as representation is understood in nonphenomenal terms -certainly as long as it is understood in purely physical terms -it does not help to appeal specifically to self-representation.
The problem with self-representation, then, is that it is just more representation.
As Levine (2006: 195) 
puts it,
Somehow, what we have in conscious states are representations that are intrinsically of subjective significance, "animated" as it were, and I maintain that we really don't understand how that is possible. It doesn't seem to be a matter of more of the same-more representation of the same kind-but rather representation of a different kind altogether.
The awareness we have of our conscious experiences, in virtue of which they are "for us," involves a kind of direct acquaintance with those states that brute representations simply do not seem to replicate, not even when they are representations of themselves.
For a self-representation as for an other-representation, we can always ask: why is there something it is like for me to have this representation? Call this the just more representation objection.
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This objection undermines the self-representational approach to the explanatory gap presented in the previous section. For suppose it is true that epistemically transparent ontological reduction of intransitive self-consciousness can proceed without closing the explanatory gap, that is, without epistemic reduction. Suppose it is true that through a sequence of more local reductive explanations, we can obtain an epistemically transparent ontological reduction that does not quite amount to epistemic reduction. Still, this kind of epistemically transparent ontological reduction, although possibly available in the case of water and H 2 O, is not available for intransitive self-consciousness and physical phenomena, because the reductive explanation of awareness in terms of representation (in Step 2 of the above explanatory sequence) fails. 21 What Levine's line of objection seems to press is the need for a sui generis notion of representation-for-me, a kind of primitive intentional relation borne by subjects, rather than by subjects' internal states. The problem with positing such a relation is that it seems to resist physicalist reduction. The upshot, in any case, is that the self-representational approach to the explanatory gap developed in §3 fails. 
Self-Representationalism and Epistemic Opacity
I think this is the deepest objection to self-representationalism. In fact, I am persuaded by
Levine that there is something fundamentally mysterious about for-me-ness, hence intransitive self-consciousness, that is not removed simply by citing self-representation.
Levine is right that the question of subjective significance applies with equal force to self-representation as to other-representation. For a self-representing state too, we can ask what it is about the state that makes it represent itself to me, rather than merely represent itself in me. In this section, I present the reaction I think a self-representationalist ought to have to Levine's objection; the reaction is more concessive than confrontational.
The first thing to point out is that although I would be keen to defend a version of self-representationalism that embraces epistemically transparent ontological reduction, self-representationalism as such admits of many varieties: a dualist variety, a materialist variety with epistemically opaque ontological reduction, a materialist variety with epistemic reduction, and even a neutral-monist variety.
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Recall that according to dualism about intransitive self-consciousness, intransitive self-consciousness is ontologically irreducible to any other properties, and is therefore (T1) Self-representationalism neutralizes the explanatory gap.
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(T2) Self-representationalism is true.
Levine's objection threatens T1, but not T2. It is thus not an objection to selfrepresentationalism as such, strictly speaking. It is an objection to something else. This is important, because the master argument for self-representationalism (from §1) can be readily reframed in such a way that it does not require that the relevant kind of inner awareness be recovered by self-representation. The premises of the argument involve a modal operator, but while it is natural to interpret the modal force in those premises as metaphysical, the argument can be reframed as involving rather nomological necessity -without commenting on whether it is merely nomological necessity. Thus
Premise 4 in the master argument could be reconstrued as follows:
4*) Nonomologically-necessarily, for any entity X and subject S, S is aware of X in the right way iff S represents X in the right way.
With this weakened premise in place, and leaving all other premises untouched, we can obtain the following weakened conclusion: 9*) Nonomologically-necessarily, for any mental state M and subject S, such that S is in M, M is phenomenally conscious iff there is a mental state M*, such that (i) S is in M*, (ii) M* represents M in the right way, and (iii) M=M*.
This guarantees that at least a dualist variety of self-representationalism is right. The weakened master argument thus concedes that self-representationalism may not recover for-me-ness, or subjective character, but insists on the following two points: (a) selfrepresentationalism can at least accommodate this for-me-ness; (b) no other theory of phenomenal consciousness can accommodate it. This is not everything a selfrepresentationalist might want, but it is not all that weak a conclusion either.
Of course, not only dualist versions of self-representationalism fail to neutralize the explanatory gap; materialist versions that embrace epistemically opaque reduction do as well. 26 And so a self-representationalist might consider reverting to this sort of materialist self-representationalism in light of the just more representation objection, conceding that the reduction of subjective character, or intransitive self-consciousness, to self-representation is epistemically opaque -due to the epistemic opacity of explaining awareness in terms of representation. Thus someone who is impressed with both the weakened master argument for self-representationalism and the just more representation objection could still embrace the disjunction of this hard-nosed materialist selfrepresentationalism and dualist self-representationalism. Both are forms of selfrepresentationalism that cohabits with a persisting explanatory gap.
What would lead one to prefer such a materialist self-representationalism over dualist self-representationalism is, of course, an antecedent commitment to physicalism.
Consider what Perry (2001) The dialectical upshot seems to me to be this. The issue of whether there is a case for self-representationalism and the issue of whether there is a case for materialism are orthogonal, since one can be a self-representationalist without being a materialist or a materialist without being a self-representationalist. The problem of the explanatory gap is relevant to the issue of whether there is a case for materialism, not to the issue of whether there is a case for self-representationalism. Given the "just more representation" consideration, epistemically transparent reduction of intransitive self-consciousness, and therefore of phenomenal consciousness, seems elusive. Whether some reduction may nonetheless be achieved depends on whether there is another kind of reduction to be had.
That is, it depends on the general viability of epistemically opaque reduction (or whether it may sometimes make sense for us to believe that feature F reduces to feature G even though we cannot quite see how it could). However this debate is resolved will determine whether a self-representationalist ought to be a materialist self-representationalist or a dualist self-representationalist.
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Conclusion
In this paper, I have been concerned to establish two main claims. The first is that the explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and physical properties is at its core an explanatory gap between a certain mode of self-consciousness -intransitive selfconsciousness -and neural activity (probably) in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The second is that the problem of the explanatory gap is not directly relevant to the issue of whether there is a case for self-representationalism: in a weakened form, the master argument for self-representationalism (presented in §1) does not require that the subjective character of experience, its intransitive self-consciousness, be recovered by self-representation, but only that it be accommodated.
To be sure, one might have wished that self-representationalism would neutralize the explanatory gap (that would certainly constitute a major advantage for the view). But this turns out to be unlikely. Although consideration of the sorites-like behavior of explanatory sequences inspires initial confidence, upon closer examination the prospects dim as the failure of reductive explanation of awareness in terms of representation comes to the fore. 31 My hesitant inclination, on the basis of the entire array of considerations examined here, is to adopt an antecedent materialist self-representationalism with epistemically opaque reduction.
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1 I explain what these qualifications mean toward the end of Chapter 4 of the book. Their exact nature will not matter here, so I will not go into it here. It does matter, however, that there exist such qualifications, meaning that not any old self-representation is supposed to be sufficient for phenomenal consciousness, only a specific variety. Prinz (this volume) objects to self-representationalism that self-representation cannot suffice for phenomenality, since the word 'word' represents itself but is not phenomenal. This specific example is actually discussed in SC Ch.4 by way of motivating one of the three qualifiers. For Prinz's objection to work, it would have to cite not just any old instance of non-phenomenal selfrepresentation, but an instance of non-phenomenal self-representation that is non-derivative, specific, and essential.
2 The latter is a determinable of which the former is a determinate. As is common, what makes X the X it is is a determinate of what makes it an X at all. 3 Here the 'because' must be understood as denoting a constitutive rather than causal explanation. That is, it is not the 'because' of "I am a bachelor because I never met the right woman," but the 'because' of "I am a bachelor because I am an unmarried man." 6 Note that claiming that for-me-ness is phenomenologically manifest need not be the same as claiming that for-me-ness is introspectively manifest. In SC Ch.5, I argue that for-me-ness is actually not introspectible, even though it is phenomenologically manifest in a non-introspective manner. How exactly this could be is something I cannot go into here, but observe that it will address Prinz's (this volume) objection that he does not find any for-me-ness when he introspects his own phenomenal experience.
considerations. Note that with the exception of the very last step, all steps in this reasoning can be understood as broadly a priori.
12 Again, compare the proof of Fermat's Last Theorem. Having read through the 100-page proof, one does not find oneself in a position to enjoy the experience of direct grasp of why it should be that x n +y n ≠z n whenever x, y, and z are non-zero integers and n>2. But with sufficient acumen in Number Theory, one might just find oneself in a position to trust that the theorem does in fact hold. 20 We can, of course, countenance a phenomenal notion of representation that casts some representations as inherently subjective (see Loar 1987 Loar , 2003 Horgan and Tienson 2002) . With this phenomenal notion of representation, one could certainly account for our awareness of our conscious experiences in terms of their manner of representing themselves: they represent themselves phenomenally. But the result would be a kind of non-reductive self-representationalism. Conversely, there may be a notion of awareness that can be accounted for in ordinary representational terms -essentially, a non-phenomenal notion of awareness. However, the kind of awareness we have of our conscious experiences, in virtue of which they are "for us" in the relevant sense, is inherently phenomenal, being as it is a component of phenomenal character. So even if we account in self-representational terms for a non-phenomenal awareness, that would not help us account for the for-me-ness of conscious experience, since the latter is constituted by a phenomenal awareness. The upshot seems to be that while we can reductively explain the phenomenal kind of awareness in terms of a phenomenal kind of (self-)representation, and can reductively explain nonphenomenal awareness in terms of a non-phenomenal kind of (self-)representation, there appears to be no way to reductively explain phenomenal awareness in terms of a non-phenomenal notion of representation.
